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To summarize the reasons for Anzac problems on 25 April, these are actually rather numerous: loss of surprise; an incorrect landing place; the last-minute shift to a right flank orientation after the landing by Sinclair MacLagan; confusion in the difficult scrub country resulting in lack of cohesion, commu-nication, discipline and direction; mediocre leader-ship in certain areas by some battalion comman-ders; failure to land field artillery, leaving Anzac troops under demoralizing and continuous shrapnel fire; a stern baptism of fire for mostly untried troops; relative failure of naval supporting fire, the lenghty four-hour halt in landing troops in the afternoon of 25 April; a reasonably quick Turkish response; and very effective Turkish shrapnel and sniper fire.  Of all these reasons, the last seems the most significant. It is hardly surprising that Godley, Bridges and other contemplated evacuation, and really the wonder is that the Anzac troops did as well as they did.

"Gallipoli 1915", (Stroud 2002), Tim Travers, p. 39.

The numbers of those killed, wounded, and missing up to noon on April 30^th were found to be :

Information taken from "The story of Anzac", Volume I, (Sydney 1981), Charles E. W. Bean, p. 536-537

PLUGGE'S PLATEAU CEMETERY

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IF STONES COULD SPEAK - ANZAC

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